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BUILDING A TRADEMARK SAFE HARBOR
FOR CONTRIBUTORY COUNTERFEITING
LIABILITY AFTER TIFFANY V. EBAY
JILLIAN DE CHAVEZ†
INTRODUCTION
On February 26, 2008, New York City law enforcement
agents raided thirty-two shops in Chinatown’s “Counterfeit
Triangle,” hauling away over $1 million in fake merchandise that
included counterfeit Tiffany, Gucci, and Coach items.1 As a
matter of law, those who knowingly used a counterfeit trademark
in connection with a sale or distribution were subject to treble
damages,2 in addition to ex parte seizure, as illustrated in this
instance.3 The resulting case settled recently, in April 2010.4 In
the interim, the city’s actions prevented the sale of counterfeit
goods from those shuttered storefronts.5
Subsequent comments by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and
other officials illustrate how counterfeiting’s harmful effects on
trademark owners, consumers, and society justify aggressive
action. Counterfeiting, the most egregious form of trademark
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1
Press Release, N.Y.C. Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg Announces Cash
Payment that Settles “Counterfeit Triangle” Case Brought by the Office of Special
Enforcement
(Apr.
6,
2010),
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/
site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID=mayor
_press_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2
Fom%2Fhtml%2F2010a%2Fpr145-10.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1
[hereinafter Press Release].
2
15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2006 Supp. & II 2008).
3
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A) (2006 Supp. & II 2008).
4
Press Release, supra note 1. Under that settlement, the shop owners agreed to
pay the city $800,000 in fines and to use the space for legitimate business purposes.
Id.
5
Id.

249
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infringement,6 “deprives legitimate businesses of customers,”
said Mayor Bloomberg in an April 2010 press release.7
Trademarks, which embody a company’s quality and goodwill8
and enable the owner to compete in the marketplace,9 are an
important business asset.10
Counterfeiting diminishes the
trademark’s value and the owner’s business when lesser-quality
goods are associated with the mark.11 Consumers are harmed
when they pay for something that does not live up to the mark’s
reputation for good quality.12 Such inferior goods can also
endanger consumers’ safety or health when the product does not
perform as expected.13 Finally, according to John Feinblatt,
Chief Advisor to the Mayor for Policy and Strategic Planning,
“[s]elling counterfeit goods is a form of organized crime.”14
Counterfeiting diverts substantial amounts of money from the

6
See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING ACT OF 1984,
S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 2, 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3628, 3630
(discussing the serious nature of counterfeiting activities).
7
Press Release, supra note 1.
8
See, e.g., E.F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F.2d 512, 518 (6th
Cir. 1943) (explaining that one goal of trademark law is to protect the good will
symbolized by the trademark, allowing owners “to build up businesses around
names by which articles are known.”); see also infra note 48.
9
S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274 (“Trademarks . . . are the essence of competition, because they make possible a choice
between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the
other.”).
10
See Anthony F. Lo Cicero et al., Intellectual Property Issues, in ACQUIRING OR
SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD COMPANY 2011, at 203, 207 (PLI Corporate Law &
Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1885, 2011) (“The goodwill associated with
certain trade names or trademarks may . . . be of substantial value . . . .”).
11
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995).
12
See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:5 (4th ed. 2011).
13
See id.; see also INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT 4 (2010) (“Counterfeit products can pose a significant risk to public
health, such as toothpaste with dangerous amounts of diethylene glycol . . . auto
parts of unknown quality that play critical roles in securing passengers and suspect
semiconductors used in life-saving defibrillators.”) [hereinafter JOINT STRATEGIC
PLAN]; TRADEMARK LAW & THE INTERNET: ISSUES, CASE LAW, AND PRACTICE TIPS
144 (Lisa E. Cristal & Neal S. Greenfield eds., 2d ed. 2001).
14
Press Release, supra note 1.
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domestic and international economy15 to fund numerous illegal
enterprises such as sweatshops, child labor, money laundering,
violent gang activity, and terrorism.16
Indeed, counterfeiting is not just a New York City problem.
It is well established that the harmful effects of counterfeiting on
trademark owners, consumers, and society as a whole are very
serious national and international problems.17 Because of this,
the United States takes an aggressive stance against
counterfeiting, enacting laws that punish counterfeiters and
those who assist them with ex parte seizures,18 destruction of
counterfeit merchandise upon seizures,19 treble damages,20 hefty
fines,21 and imprisonment.22
There are harsh penalties for counterfeiting, but their
effectiveness is greatly diminished if counterfeiters can easily
avoid detection—a more difficult problem on the Internet than in
the physical world.23 Offline, there is a physical location to
investigate and raid, counterfeit merchandise to seize, and at
least some of the individuals participating in the counterfeiting
are present. Ex parte seizures happen swiftly so that the
counterfeiter cannot destroy the evidence or escape by relocating
before the goods are seized.24 In some cases, seizing the

15
See ANNE GILSON LALONDE, 2-5 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 5.19(1) (2011);
About Counterfeiting, INT’L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COALITION, http://www.iacc.org/
about-counterfeiting/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (estimating the cost of global
counterfeiting to be $600 billion per year; in the United States alone, counterfeiting
costs legitimate American industries between $200 and $250 billion annually and
about 750,000 jobs).
16
See PAUL R. PARADISE, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, PRODUCT PIRACY, AND
THE BILLION DOLLAR THREAT TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 22–23 (1999).
17
See supra notes 15–16.
18
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
19
15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2006).
20
15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (indicating that treble damages
may be either of profits or damages, whichever is greater).
21
18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); see also United States v. Foote,
413 F.3d 1240, 1252–53 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming the lower court’s fine of more
than $104,000 for defendant’s trafficking in counterfeit goods).
22
18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
23
See Thomas Fedorek, Computers + Connectivity = New Opportunities for
Criminals and Dilemmas for Investigators, N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb. 2004, at 10, 10 (“The
anonymity afforded by cyberspace decreases, to a significant degree, the criminal’s
risk of detection and capture, and increases, to an equally significant degree, the
difficulty of investigating cybercrimes. The evanescence of digital evidence stymies
traditional methods of search and seizure.”).
24
GILSON, supra note 15, at § 5.19 (4)(b)(i).
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counterfeit goods is enough to shut down the illegal business.25
But online, there is no physical place to raid, no immediate and
observable hand-to-hand exchange of cash and goods. On the
Internet, people can buy counterfeit goods from anywhere in the
world. Transactions happen instantly. The Internet also tends
to anonymize counterfeiters so that they are harder to catch than
their offline counterparts.26 If a seller of counterfeit merchandise
suspects action will be taken against him, the anonymity of the
Internet makes it easy for him to assume new online identities
and sell items on other websites, such as Craigslist, that have
few registration requirements.27 Current anti-counterfeiting
measures lose much of their bite if counterfeiters are more
difficult to find.
The same ease, speed, and far-reaching
communication capabilities that facilitate countless lawful
business transactions over the Internet also make it very
challenging and costly for trademark owners—especially owners
of high-end, luxury marks28— to police their brands.29
A recent set of cases in which eBay defended against several
trademark owners’ allegations of contributory trademark
infringement illustrates one response from trademark owners—
target the online service providers that hosted counterfeiting
activity under the theory of contributory trademark infringement
and force them to take more action against counterfeiting on
their websites.30 The facts of Tiffany v. eBay,31 Hermes v. eBay,32
25

See Ann Hiaring Hocking, Basic Principles of Trademark Law, in
UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 2011, at 85, 115
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No.
1054, 2011) (“Since many counterfeit operations are structured to create quick
profits form [sic] a short-lived business, the seizure provisions allow trademark
holders to strike quickly at the heart of the illicit operation, effectively shutting it
down.”).
26
Scott Gelin & G. Roxanne Elings, Contributory Liability for Trademark
Counterfeiting in an Ecommerce World, JIPEL, jipel.law.nyu.edu/2010/04/
contributory-liability-for-trademark-counterfeiting-in-an-ecommerce-world/
(last
visited Sept. 25, 2012).
27
Id.
28
See Katherine C. Spelman, What’s New in Anti-Counterfeiting, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE 2010, at 379, 383 (PLI Intellectual Prop.,
Course Handbook Ser. No. 1022, 2010).
29
See generally Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 647.
30
See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine:
The Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1365–66 (2006).
31
Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 96.
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and LVMH v. eBay33 were virtually the same: an owner of a highend, luxury trademark found significant amounts of counterfeit
merchandise being sold on eBay, then sued on the grounds that
eBay had some level of awareness of infringement on its website,
requiring eBay to take more action than it already did. The
American and French courts arrived at divergent conclusions.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Tiffany v. eBay reflects the
American approach to contributory trademark infringement,
which currently favors online marketplaces like eBay.34 First,
the court held that an online marketplace’s “general knowledge”
of infringement on its website is not enough to trigger liability.35
Second, a prompt take-down of allegedly counterfeit listings,
through eBay’s Verified Owners Rights (“VeRO”)36 program,
adequately addressed trademark infringement on the site.37 The
Second Circuit essentially applied copyright safe-harbor
reasoning from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)
to find that eBay’s efforts excluded it from liability.38 eBay,
however, was less successful in France.
Although eBay
presented these same efforts in its defense in the Hermes and
LVMH cases, and despite a statutory framework similar to the
American common law standard for contributory trademark
infringement, the French courts ruled against eBay.39 In both
French cases, eBay was perceived as having the requisite degree
of knowledge to trigger liability.40 The French courts named
specific steps that eBay should have taken that would have
limited its liability, such as requiring users to provide
32
Hermes Int’l v. Feitz, Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI] [ordinary court of
original jurisdiction] Troyes, June 4, 2008, Docket No. 06/02604 (Fr.), translation
available at http://www.law.pace.edu/files/pilr/AllCasesTranslated.pdf [hereinafter
Hermes case].
33
SA Louis Vuitton Malletier v. eBay, Inc., Tribunal de Commerce [T. Com.]
[Commercial Court of Paris] Paris, June 30, 2008, First Section B, Docket No.
2006077799
(Fr.),
translation
available
at
http://www.
sunsteinlaw.com/media/FrenchOpinions.pdf [hereinafter LVMH case].
34
Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103; see also Elizabeth K. Levin, Note, A Safe Harbor for
Trademark: Reevaluating Secondary Trademark Liability after Tiffany v. eBay, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 491, 494 (2009).
35
Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107, 109 (requiring specific knowledge of infringement or
willful blindness to trigger liability for contributory trademark infringement).
36
See infra Part II.A.1.
37
See infra Part II.A.2.
38
See infra Part II.A.1.
39
See infra Part II.B.
40
See infra Part II.B.
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information about the product’s authenticity.41 The effect of the
ruling was that online marketplaces like eBay have a duty to
take preemptive steps to fight trademark infringement on these
websites; a reactive mechanism such as the one approved by the
Second Circuit was inadequate.42 These divergent decisions
highlight competing policy concerns about assessing an online
marketplace’s role in contributory trademark infringement and
deciding the site’s exposure to liability.
Since current anti-counterfeiting tools are not easily applied
to the Internet, thereby diminishing their effectiveness, this Note
argues that compensating for this deficiency requires legal
provisions that encourage online service providers to implement
both proactive and reactive anti-counterfeiting measures. After
Tiffany, e-commerce businesses in the United States are only
required to react appropriately to counterfeiting on their
websites. Though it is well-settled that trademark owners must
police their own brand,43 the Tiffany decision makes it extremely
difficult and costly for owners to combat counterfeiting on their
own. Furthermore, the Second Circuit’s application of a reactive
law written specifically for secondary copyright infringement on
the Internet does not effectively address the entire temporal
range of harm posed by trademark infringement.44 Part I
discusses the goals and policies underlying American trademark
law and explains where counterfeiting fits in this framework.
This Part also traces the development of the judicially-created
doctrine of contributory trademark law and how it has been
applied in counterfeiting cases. Part II compares the American
approach to contributory trademark infringement to that of
European courts. Part III analyzes and assesses how each
approach addresses the harms of contributory trademark
infringement on the Internet. Part IV proposes a legislative
solution similar to the safe-harbor provisions of the DMCA, but
tailored to the specific goals, policies, and harms faced by
trademark owners. While the Second Circuit properly decided
that a notice-and-takedown procedure is one effective way to
41

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
43
See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 518 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (“[R]ights holders bear the principal responsibility to police their
trademarks.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131
S. Ct. 647 (2010).
44
See infra Parts I.A. & IV.B.
42
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combat trademark infringement on the Internet, it is a reactive
mechanism that does not effectively address harms to
trademarks owners and consumers that accrue even before
someone buys a counterfeit item. For this reason, a safe-harbor
provision for trademark law should incentivize online
marketplaces like eBay to take preventive action against
trademark infringement.
I.

A.

THE GOALS OF TRADEMARK LAW AND THE EVOLUTION OF
CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT DOCTRINE
The Goals of Trademark Law

Because the overarching goal of trademark law is to foster
competition,45 and the information conveyed by trademarks46 is
useful and valuable to owners and consumers47 in the
marketplace, the standard for trademark infringement is based
on the concept of confusion.48 Thus, federal law imposes civil and
45
Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark
Use”, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 376 (2006).
46
“A trademark is a word, name, symbol, device, or other designation, or a
combination of such designations, that is distinctive of a person’s goods or services
and that is used in a manner that identifies those goods or services and
distinguishes them from the goods or services of others. A service mark is a
trademark that is used in connection with services.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (2011). Trademarks communicate information to
consumers to help them decide purchases and prevent confusion. See Dan L. Burk,
Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 699–700
(1998) (“Consumers . . . use the mark as a signal of the quality of goods, expecting
that goods branded with the mark will be of the quality they have come to associate
with past purchases bearing the mark.”). Trademarks are a symbol of the good will
associated with the owner’s products or services. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed. 2011).
Trademarks are also symbols of the owner’s investment of time, energy, and money
into the brand. Courtenay Brian Allen, Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc.:
Defining Use of a Mark and the Source of Confusion in Trademark Infringement, 49
BAYLOR L. REV. 847, 856 (1997).
47
See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 158, 163–64 (1995)
(“[T]rademark law . . . reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making
purchasing decisions, for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that [the
trademarked item] is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items
that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure
a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial,
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.” (citations omitted)).
48
Lanham Act § 43(a) prohibits “use[] in commerce” of a mark “on or in
connection with any goods or services” that “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [the
infringer’s] goods, services, or commercial activities.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006);
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criminal liability on those who use counterfeit marks that are
“likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”49
Confusion can occur at the point of sale, but also before or after a
sale is made. Point-of-sale confusion is when an actual consumer
is confused about the source or origin of a product or service.50
This is different from post-sale confusion, when an observer sees
someone with an infringing item and mistakenly attributes it to
the trademark owner.51 Another possibility is pre-sale confusion,
which occurs when a plaintiff’s trademark is used to initiate
contact with a prospective buyer.52 In the case of pre-sale
confusion, a defendant can be liable even though the buyer is no
longer confused at the time of purchase.53
Together, the concepts of point-of-sale, post-sale, and presale confusion reflect trademark law’s goal of protecting both
consumers and trademark owners.54 As such, each doctrine’s
response to the injurious effects of misleading information differs
see also S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946) (describing the policies promoted by the
Lanham Act: (1) to prevent consumer confusion, (2) to protect the goodwill of
businesses, and (3) to promote competition within the market).
49
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006); see also 18 U.S.C § 2320(e)(1) (2006 & Supp. II
2008).
50
Marshall Leaffer, Sixty Years of the Lanham Act: The Decline and Demise of
Monopoly Phobia, in U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 85, 126 (Hugh
Hansen ed., 2006).
51
Id. at 128; see also Acxiom Corp. v. Axiom, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 478, 497 (D.
Del. 1998) (“[T]he senior user’s potential purchasers or ongoing customers might
mistakenly associate the inferior quality work of the junior user with the senior user
and, therefore, refuse to deal with the senior user in the future.”); Payless
Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
52
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir.
1987) (explaining that pre-sale confusion arises “not in the fact that a third party
would do business with Pegasus Petroleum believing it related to Mobil, but rather
in the likelihood that Pegasus Petroleum would gain crucial credibility during the
initial phases of a deal”). Other examples of how pre-sale confusion harms
trademark owners can be seen in cases involving domain names. See, e.g., DorrOliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 1996); Brookfield
Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062, 1064 (9th Cir.
1999) (initial interest confusion is when one party has used another’s mark “in a
manner calculated to capture initial consumer attention, even though no actual sale
is finally completed as a result of the confusion,” and “the fact that there is only
initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that [defendant] would be
misappropriating [plaintiff’s] acquired goodwill”); see also Leaffer, supra note 50, at
129. Pre-sale confusion is also referred to as initial interest confusion. See
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23:6.
53
Leaffer, supra note 50, at 129.
54
See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854–55 n.14 (1982)
(citing S. REP. NO. 79-1333 (1946)).
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slightly, depending on when that confusion occurs.
When
analyzing point-of-sale confusion, the focus is on purchasers.55
Trademarks facilitate information that enables purchasers to
make informed decisions about which products to purchase.56
When used properly, a trademark quickly tells the consumer
which company the product comes from, suggesting the product’s
quality and distinguishing it from competing brands.57 Over
time, consumers may come to infer the trademark’s reputation
and goodwill.58 Counterfeiting creates confusion about this kind
of information, which is costly and inefficient for consumers.59
Consumers needlessly spend money when they buy an inferior
product because they have confused it for another.60 In some
cases, such confusion has human health costs when the product
does not perform as expected, or has unexpected side effects.61
Pre- and post-sale confusion doctrines address harms that
are not adequately addressed by the consumer-oriented focus of
point-of-sale confusion.62 Even where there is no confusion about
the purchased product,63 courts recognize that confusion before
and after the sale detracts from the efforts of rightful owners to
market and protect their brand.64 Such confusion damages a
trademark’s reputation and goodwill.65 As such, protecting their
trademarks allows owners to reap the benefits of their work
while excluding free riders from profiting from a trademark they
had no role in creating.66
55

General Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 355 (6th
Cir. 2006).
56
See supra note 46.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See Burk, supra note 46, at 702–03.
60
See supra note 46.
61
MCCARTHY, supra note 12.
62
Leaffer, supra note 50, at 128–30.
63
Confusion is not the only reason why people buy counterfeit products. There is
a market to feed people’s desire for cheaper counterfeits to use as status symbols.
See Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status
Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381,
1393, 1398 (2005).
64
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 23:5–23:6.
65
See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.14 (1982) (“By
applying a trademark to goods produced by one other than the trademark’s owner,
the infringer deprives the owner of the goodwill which he spent energy, time, and
money to obtain.”); see also Leaffer, supra note 50, at 129.
66
LEE WILSON, THE TRADEMARK GUIDE: A FRIENDLY GUIDE TO PROTECTING
AND PROFITING FROM TRADEMARKS 3 (2004).
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As discussed previously, the Internet can exacerbate harms
to both consumers and trademark owners caused by
infringement;67 but, in addition, the Internet has made it
especially difficult for trademark owners to police their brands
online. Trademark owners find that the online marketplace can
stand in their way as they try to reach direct infringers who have
used those Internet services.68 In response, trademark owners
have gone after the online marketplace under theories of
secondary liability.69
B.

The Evolution of Contributory Trademark Infringement

Because chasing after direct counterfeiters on the Internet
has been extremely difficult and costly, trademark owners have
turned their attention to online service providers by suing them
under the theory of contributory trademark infringement.
Although the Lanham Act specifically addresses direct
trademark infringement and not contributory trademark
infringement,70 the Supreme Court recognized contributory
trademark infringement as a cause of action in Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.71 As discussed in this
Section, subsequent cases extended the act’s application, so that
it now includes trademark-counterfeiting cases.
Initially, the Inwood standard for contributory trademark
infringement applied only to manufacturers and distributors of
products. In Inwood, the owner of a trademarked drug sued a
generic manufacturer for “induc[ing] pharmacists illegally to
substitute a generic drug for [the trademarked drug] and to
mislabel the substitute drug” as the trademarked drug.72 The
defendant had supplied its own drugs to pharmacies, which

67
TRADEMARK LAW & THE INTERNET: ISSUES, CASE LAW, AND PRACTICE TIPS,
supra note 13, at 142.
68
See Ellie Mercado, Note, As Long As “It” Is Not Counterfeit: Holding eBay
Liable for Secondary Trademark Infringement in the Wake of LVMH and Tiffany
Inc., 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 115, 116–18 (2010); Virginia Welch, Comment,
Contributory Trademark Infringement: Who Bears the Burden of Policing Online
Counterfeit Activity?, 13 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 361, 364 (2010).
69
See infra Part I.B.
70
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 647 (“Contributory trademark infringement is a judicially created doctrine
that derives from the common law of torts.”).
71
456 U.S. 844, 860 (1982) (White, J., concurring).
72
Id. at 850 (majority opinion).
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looked very similar to the plaintiffs’.73 Pharmacies then used the
generic drug in place of the trademarked drug.74 The Supreme
Court set forth the following standard: A party is liable for
contributory trademark infringement “if a manufacturer or
distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement.”75 The second part of the Inwood test allows
trademark owners to hold financially sound parties accountable
in addition to or in place of the direct infringer.76 It is also easier
for trademark owners to seek redress; suing one manufacturer or
distributor is easier and perhaps more effective than suing each
direct infringer separately.77
A set of cases involving counterfeit goods then extended the
application of the second Inwood scenario to parties with a
degree of supervision over the persons and activities taking place
on physical marketplaces. Under the reasoning of Hard Rock
Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc.,78 flea market
owners could be held liable for contributory trademark
infringement. In that case, Hard Rock Café sued Concession
Services Inc. (“CSI”) after learning that a flea market vendor was
selling counterfeit shirts on space provided by CSI.79 Noting that
trademark infringement is rooted in tort principles governing
landlord or licensor liability,80 and that Inwood imposed similar
duties on manufacturers and distributors, the court found that

73

Id. at 846–47.
See id. at 851–53.
75
Id. at 854.
76
Fara S. Sunderji, Note, Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory
Trademark Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc.
Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 920 (2005).
77
See Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Obtaining
an injunction against each and every [direct infringer] would be infeasible.
Trademark owners cannot hire investigators to shop every retail store in the nation.
And even if they could and did, and obtained injunctions against all present
violators, this would not stop the counterfeiting. Other infringers would spring up,
and would continue infringing until enjoined.”); cf. In re Aimster Copyright Litig.,
334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that suing individual copyright
infringers is impractical and futile in the face of voluminous music file sharing over
the Internet).
78
955 F.2d 1143, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1992).
79
Id. at 1145.
80
Id. at 1148–49.
74
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the Inwood standard should apply.81 As such, a flea market
operator would be liable if he knew or had reason to know that
the vendor was selling counterfeit merchandise.82 Additionally,
the court recognized that “willful blindness” could satisfy the
actual knowledge requirement for the purposes of the Lanham
Act.83 “Willful blindness” is when a party, such as a flea market
operator, “suspect[s] wrongdoing” on his or her premises “and
deliberately fail[s] to investigate.”84
The reasoning in Hard Rock Café was followed in Fonovisa,
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,85 which presented a similar set of
facts. In Fonovisa, a trademark owner of sound recordings sued
a flea market operator because a vendor sold counterfeit
recordings on the premises.86 The flea market operator was
liable for contributory trademark infringement because he knew
of the vendor’s past infringing activities at the flea market, yet
failed to take action against the vendor to stop the
infringement.87 This holding emphasizes that a third party can
be liable when it provides the means through which trademark
infringement occurs, even if the third party is not directly
responsible for the infringement itself.88 Fonovisa reiterated this
point:
A party can be liable for contributory trademark
infringement if it “continues to supply a product knowing that
the recipient is using the product to engage in trademark
infringement.”89
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.90 further
extended the Inwood standard by applying it to Internet service
providers. Noting that Hard Rock and Fonovisa allowed courts
to consider the extent of the defendant’s control over the direct
infringer when there was no “product” for the purposes of the
Inwood test, the Lockheed court concluded that a service provider
can be liable if it has “[d]irect control and monitoring of the

81

Id. at 1148.
See id. at 1149.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
86
Id. at 260.
87
Id. at 265.
88
See id. at 264; see also Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1148; Polo Ralph Lauren
Corp. v. Chinatown Gift Shop, 855 F. Supp. 648, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
89
Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
90
194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
82
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instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s
mark[s].”91 In Lockheed, Lockheed sued Network Solutions after
learning that third parties registered domain names
substantially similar to Lockheed’s service mark, “skunk
works.”92 However, Network Solutions was not liable because the
service it provided—registering domain names—did not satisfy
“[t]he ‘direct control and monitoring’ rule established by Hard
Rock and Fonovisa.”93
A series of cases following Lockheed illustrate the challenges
of suing e-commerce sites under the current contributory
trademark infringement standard to fight counterfeiting on the
Internet. One issue is deciding where the service provider falls
in the spectrum of specific knowledge or willful blindness on one
end, and generalized knowledge on the other.94 Another issue is
deciding how closely related the service provider is in its
involvement with direct infringement.95 Yet another issue is how
much an online service provider can be expected to do to prevent
or combat infringement on its website.96 As the following eBay
cases demonstrate, online auction sites fall somewhere in the
middle on each spectrum, which has lead to inconsistent
decisions that add layers of difficulty for policing trademarks.

91

Id. at 984.
Id. at 983 (listing the domain-name combinations at issue,
including skunkworks.com, skunkworks.net, skunkwrks.com, skunkwerks.com,
skunkworx.com, and theskunkworks.com).
93
Id. at 985.
94
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1188
(C.D. Cal. 2002); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F.
Supp. 2d 1098, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (likening defendant ISPs to the flea market
operators in Fonovisa and deciding that defendant ISPs were willfully blind because
they did not take steps to terminate infringing activity, despite their ability to).
95
See Akanoc, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (by “physically host[ing] websites on
their servers and rout[ing] internet traffic to and from those websites,” defendants
were more closely involved in the infringement than the defendant in Lockheed, who
“merely provided a ‘rote translation service’ ”).
96
See Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (Defendant was like the flea market in
Fonovisa, and “ha[d] the right to terminate webmasters at will, [control] consumer
access, and promote[] its services.” Defendant also had “detailed policing of sites.”
With these activities, there was “a strong likelihood of success for” the argument
that defendant had sufficient control over the infringing websites.); see also
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 962 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (defendant’s involvement with potentially infringing uses of domain names
was too remote to extend contributory liability, “absent a showing that [the
defendant domain name registrar] had unequivocal knowledge that a domain name
was being used to infringe a trademark”), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
92
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II. THE EBAY CASES: OPPOSITE APPROACHES TO CONTRIBUTORY
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT ON ONLINE AUCTION SITES
In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc.,97 the Second Circuit
extended the principles of Inwood and its progeny to include
online auction sites. When Tiffany discovered that a substantial
amount of counterfeit products were being sold on eBay,98 Tiffany
tried to sue eBay for contributory trademark infringement but
failed.99 But when Hermes and Louis Vuitton Malletier sued
eBay in France for the same reasons that Tiffany did, under a
theory of contributory trademark infringement similar to the
United States’, they were successful.100 Together, these cases
present both sides of an underlying issue: What, if anything,
should be required of online marketplaces in the fight against
counterfeiting?
A.

The American Approach: Tiffany v. eBay

1.

The Facts of Tiffany v. eBay

Tiffany & Co., founded in 1837, is a widely recognized luxury
brand firm that describes itself as “the world’s premier jeweler
and America’s house of design.”101
Tiffany places its
97
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 647 (2010). Tiffany was the first American case dealing with contributory
trademark infringement in the context of online auction sites. Id. at 105.
98
Id. at 97. The parties disagreed on the amount of counterfeit Tiffany products
that were actually being sold. After conducting its own survey in 2004 and 2005,
Tiffany concluded that 73.1% and 75.5% of purported Tiffany merchandise was
counterfeit. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 647
(2010). Although the district court below found that Tiffany’s surveys were
“methodologically flawed and of questionable value,” id. at 512, the court agreed that
a “significant portion” of Tiffany sterling jewelry listed on eBay was counterfeit, id.
at 486, and that eBay knew “that some portion of the Tiffany goods sold on its
website might be counterfeit.” Id. at 507.
99
Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103. Tiffany also sued eBay for direct trademark
infringement and false advertising. Id. at 96. The Second Circuit dismissed Tiffany’s
direct trademark infringement claim, but remanded the case for the false
advertising claim. Id. at 114. On remand, the Southern District dismissed the false
advertising claim. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4607(RJS), 2010 WL
3733894, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010). A discussion of these two causes of actions
falls outside the scope of this Note.
100
See Kate Goldwasser, Knock it Off: An Analysis of Trademark Counterfeit
Goods Regulation in the United States, France, and Belgium, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 207, 222 (2010).
101
TIFFANY & CO., http://www.tiffany.com/about (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
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“indisputably famous” mark on the high-end lines of jewelry,
watches, and home goods it designs.102 The value of Tiffany’s
mark results from over one hundred years of building a
reputation for excellent quality.103 To maintain the integrity of
the Tiffany brand, Tiffany conducts strict quality checks and sells
products only through authorized channels.104 eBay is not one of
these channels.105
eBay, one of the largest online auction sites, allows people
from all over the world to buy from and sell to each other
practically any kind and number of items.106 There are over one
hundred million listings worldwide on eBay at any given time in
over 50,000 different categories.107 In 2010, the total value of
items sold on eBay’s websites was $62 billion.108 Registering and
navigating eBay is simple.109 But eBay does require its users to
agree to its User Agreement, under which users agree to comply
with applicable laws and refrain from selling prohibited items,
including counterfeits.110 Sellers can list one or multiple items.111
Buyers can peruse as many listings as they want and search
items based on keyword or category.112 Buyers and sellers
communicate directly with each other on eBay’s website,113 and
eBay never physically possesses the items for sale.114 eBay
generates profits by charging sellers a fixed fee for their use of
eBay’s services and by collecting a commission at the close of
each sale.115
102

Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
Id.
104
Id. at 472–73 (authorized channels are Tiffany’s retail stores, catalogs,
website, and Corporate Sales Department).
105
See
Tiffany
&
Co.,
EBAY,
http://cgi3.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?
ViewUserPage&userid=tiffanytrademark2 (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
106
Who we Are, EBAY, http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
107
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 647 (2010).
108
Who we Are, EBAY, http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
109
To register, users provide their name, address, and a banking or checking
account. Users are also asked to provide a unique username and password.
110
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Your User Aregeement,
EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html (last visited Sept. 25,
2012).
111
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
112
Id. at 474–75.
113
Id. at 475.
114
Id.
115
Id.
103
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Both Tiffany and eBay devote substantial resources to
combat counterfeiting. Tiffany has budgeted over $14 million to
anti-counterfeiting.116 Prior to this lawsuit, Tiffany attacked
sellers on eBay for counterfeiting, and conducted numerous
“enforcement actions” like customs seizures.117 Employees spent
172 to 240 man-hours per month monitoring eBay and reporting
listings of counterfeit items to eBay.118 Starting in 2006, Tiffany
began to “patrol eBay and report violations on a daily basis.”119
On the other side of the equation, eBay was spending $20 million
each year and devoting about twenty-five percent of its
employees to fight counterfeiting on the website.120 eBay had
various departments and programs to address counterfeiting on
its website.121 Tiffany was a frequent user of these services.
One of eBay’s major anti-counterfeiting measures was its
VeRO program, which puts in place a mechanism very similar to
the notice-and-takedown scheme used in copyright infringement
cases, codified in § 512(c) of the DMCA.122 Section 512(c) limits
liability for online “service providers,”123 provided that the service
satisfies certain requirements, including a prompt takedown of
infringing material once notice has been given.124 Under the
VeRO program, a trademark owner like Tiffany could report a
particular listing using a Notice of Claimed Infringement
(“NOCI”) form.125 Should a trademark owner like Tiffany find
specific instances of counterfeit merchandise being sold on eBay,
the trademark owner would submit a NOCI.126 Upon receiving
116

Id. at 484.
Id. at 481.
118
Id. at 484.
119
Id. The court, however, recognized that Tiffany could have made a greater
effort to fight counterfeiting. Id. at 485. Tiffany did not develop its own process to
hasten its monitoring and reporting to eBay, so Tiffany simply could not keep up
with the listings. Id. at 484–85. Neither did Tiffany take eBay’s suggestion to use
online reputation management services. Id. at 484.
120
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 647 (2010); Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
121
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 476, 479, 489, 491 (eBay’s partnership with
PayPal to set up “buyer protection programs”; eBay’s “Trust and Safety” department,
which was 4,000 employees strong; warning messages when users listed Tiffany
items, prompting the seller to ensure that the item was authentic; “threestrikes”
rule).
122
See infra notes 178–79 and accompanying text.
123
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
124
Id.
125
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 478.
126
Id.
117
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this, eBay would remove the listing.127 eBay’s practice was to
investigate and remove the illicit listings within twenty-four
hours of receiving a NOCI.128
2.

The Second Circuit’s Decision

Ultimately, the Second Circuit applied the Inwood test and
dismissed Tiffany’s contributory trademark infringement
claim.129 Since eBay provided a service and not a product, the
issue was whether eBay had the requisite quantum of knowledge
to trigger liability for contributory trademark infringement.130
Tiffany provided data131 and expert testimony132 to show that
eBay had “generalized knowledge” that a significant amount of
counterfeit Tiffany items were being sold on its website, making
eBay secondarily liable for the infringing activities.133 However,
the court held that generalized knowledge was insufficient to
hold eBay liable for contributory trademark infringement
because Inwood required specific knowledge or willful
blindness.134 For example, if eBay had known of particular
instances of trademark infringement but failed to react, Inwood’s
specific knowledge prong would be met. Also, if eBay was aware
of infringement on its website but refused to respond, Inwood’s
willful blindness prong would be met. In this case, eBay had
neither: Tiffany did not raise any instance in which eBay had
specific knowledge of infringement,135 and with strong anticounterfeiting tools like VeRO, it could not be said that eBay was

127

Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 647 (2010).
128
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 478. In most situations, eBay removed such
listings within twelve hours. Id.
129
Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 105–07.
130
Id. at 107. On appeal, eBay dropped its argument that it was not subject to
Inwood, leading the Second Circuit to assume that Inwood applied. Id. at 105–06
(citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982)).
131
Id. at 97–98.
132
See Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 27–28, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600
F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3947-cv), 2008 WL 8430999, at *15–16.
133
See Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.,
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3947-cv), 2008 WL 8595304, at *4.
134
Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109–10.
135
Id. at 109.
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willfully blind.136 eBay was not liable for contributory trademark
infringement for the counterfeiting that Tiffany found on the
website.137
B.

The French Approach: Hermes and Louis Vuitton Malletier

eBay did not fare as well in two lawsuits in France that were
decided shortly before Tiffany ended.138 Under a similar set of
facts, eBay was found liable for contributory trademark
infringement. The French courts had a different view on
whether eBay’s level of knowledge could trigger liability, which
depended on the courts’ interpretations of whether eBay was an
active participant in transactions on its website or a passive
venue provider for third-party transactions.
In the first case, Hermes v. eBay, Hermes sued eBay after
discovering that an eBay user sold counterfeit products bearing a
counterfeit Hermes mark.139 Hermes sued eBay in France,
seeking to hold eBay jointly liable for the infringement.140
Section 6.1.2 of France’s On-Line Trade Confidence Act of 2004,
which complements Article L713-2 of the French Intellectual
Property Code,141 uses a test similar to that from Inwood: A
party is liable for contributory infringement if they knew of, yet
failed to remove infringing merchandise from the “on-line
communication services” geared toward public use.142 But unlike
the Second Circuit, the Hermes court did not construe the statute
in eBay’s favor.143 If the Hermes court had considered eBay a
“hosting site,” then it would not have been liable for
counterfeiting on the website.144 Instead, the court considered
eBay an active provider of tools and services, helping sellers to
publish their items, communicate with other users, and facilitate
monetary transactions.145 Because of its substantial role in
136
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
137
Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109.
138
Id. at 105 n.9.
139
See Hermes case, supra note 32, at 1.
140
Id.
141
Goldwasser, supra note 100, at 221.
142
See Hermes case, supra note 32, at 14.
143
Id. at 17.
144
Id. at 15.
145
Id. (“eBay companies provide tools, permitting to market the sold goods to the
sellers, organize object presentation on their site . . . [and] communication services
for intermediation purposes”).
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facilitating these online exchanges—including illicit sales of
counterfeit items—eBay was responsible for policing its own site
for illegal activity.146 As a service provider, eBay had the burden
of implementing effective anti-counterfeiting measures, such as
requiring sellers to provide an item’s serial number, type
number, or certificate of authenticity.147
This reasoning was confirmed by LVMH, a case decided
three weeks after Hermes.148 As in the Hermes and Tiffany cases,
Louis Vuitton Malletier sued eBay after finding that counterfeit
merchandise was being sold from its website.149 The court viewed
eBay as a “brokerage site” under Section 6.1.2, not a “mere
hoster.”150 eBay was a “mandatory player in sales taking place
on its sites,” playing “a very active role, particularly through
commercial reminders, in order to increase the number of
transactions.”151
Furthermore, eBay derived profits from
engaging in commercial activities, and, “by its very nature, [did]
not imply lack of knowledge and control of the information
transmitted on its sites.”152 Like the Hermes court, the LVMH
court found eBay’s VeRO program an insufficient means to
combat counterfeiting on its website.153 The court declared that
eBay should have taken preemptive steps such as requiring
sellers to provide a certificate of authenticity.154
III. WHY ONLINE MARKETPLACES SHOULD DO MORE TO PREVENT
COUNTERFEITING
In evaluating the decisions of the Second Circuit and the
French courts, it is important to keep in mind the overarching
goals of trademark law: to encourage healthy competition in the
marketplace by (1) protecting consumers, (2) preventing
confusion regarding the origin of a particular product, and
(3) encouraging trademark holders’ investments in quality goods
and services.155 The Second Circuit and the French courts used
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Id.
Id. at 16.
See LVMH case, supra note 33, at 12.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
See supra Part I.A.

WF_de Chavez (Do Not Delete)

268

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

12/3/2012 12:39 PM

[Vol. 86:249

similar standards for contributory trademark infringement but
arrived at opposite conclusions about eBay’s level of knowledge.
This led to different evaluations of how many steps eBay should
be expected to take to satisfy its role in combating trademark
infringement online. With each approach, there are pros and
cons for trademark owners and online marketplaces.
The Second Circuit’s decision, which favors online
marketplaces, reflects an appreciation for how the Internet made
possible a booming e-commerce industry.156 Certainly, the court
recognized the value of eBay’s business model—and similar ecommerce models—and wished to avoid interfering with it.157
eBay and other similar sites give consumers more options, which
is an incentive for trademark owners to create more quality
products and maintain their reputation. American courts do not
want to impose duties on these businesses that would be so costly
or inefficient so as to cripple valuable businesses like eBay.158 On
some level, a DMCA-style notice-and-takedown procedure as
implemented by VeRO is an important step to help trademark
owners police their brand.159
The knowledge requirement,
however, is very difficult to meet, which hinders a trademark
owner’s efforts to protect its mark.160
On the other hand, the French courts’ decision favors
trademark owners. Instead of an appreciation for how the
Internet allowed the prosperous development of e-commerce, the
French courts emphasized how the Internet endangered
legitimate business by “foster[ing] the marketing of fraudulent
products, among them those that are the result of infringement,
that scourge of the legal economy.”161 The LVMH court was
particularly unimpressed with eBay’s motto that “anyone,
anywhere and at any time, [could] offer, sell or buy practically
anything he or she wishes,”162 including counterfeiters.
156
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
157
See, e.g., Levin, supra note 34, at 526.
158
Emily Favre, Note, Online Auction Houses: How Trademark Owners Protect
Brand Integrity Against Counterfeiting, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 165, 195–96 (2007).
159
See infra Part IV.A.
160
Matthew C. Berntsen, Note, Knowledge and Misfeasance: Tiffany v. eBay and
the Knowledge Requirement of Contributory Trademark Infringement, 16 B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 102, 128 (2010) (explaining that Tiffany requires trademark owners to
prove a very high degree of knowledge, which is difficult to do).
161
LVMH case, supra note 33, at 9.
162
Id. at 10.

WF_de Chavez (Do Not Delete)

2012]

BUILDING A TRADEMARK SAFE HARBOR

12/3/2012 12:39 PM

269

Ultimately, the French courts did not think that eBay’s VeRO
system was effective.163
Since modern technology allows
counterfeiters to closely imitate trademarks, a counterfeiter
could easily circumvent VeRO if no one identifies the replica.
Failing to implement measures to prevent counterfeiters from
using the website was tantamount to encouraging the sale of
counterfeit merchandise, and eBay stood to profit from this.164
Even though the French courts required sites like eBay to
implement more preventive measures against counterfeiting, in
doing so they have forced online auction sites to take more
responsibility in fighting trademark infringement.165
The French approach to
contributory trademark
counterfeiting, which requires online marketplaces to do more
than react to notices of counterfeiting, is consistent with the
United States’ traditionally aggressive stance against
counterfeiting. The current American standard, combined with
the difficulty of tracking counterfeiters online, enables significant
amounts of counterfeiting to continue in online marketplaces,
even if it is a generally known fact that counterfeiting occurs
there.166
The current American contributory trademark
infringement standards must adapt accordingly to the special
challenges posed by online marketplaces. One way to do this is
by creating a safe-harbor provision similar to § 512(c) of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which provides incentives for
online service providers to work with copyright owners by
promptly removing infringing material posted by third parties on
their websites.167
Like § 512(c), a trademark safe-harbor
provision for online marketplaces should require them to meet
certain standards before they can claim the provision’s protection
from liability. eBay’s VeRO program, which was modeled after
§ 512(c), is an effective reactive mechanism to trademark owners’
allegations of counterfeiting—within a reasonable time, eBay can
take down infringing material while leaving legitimate goods
posted. But eBay’s take-down mechanism is not triggered until
the trademark owner notifies eBay, and the Tiffany decision does
163

Id. at 12; Hermes case, supra note 32, at 16.
See Hermes case, supra note 32, at 14–16.
165
It is well established that trademark owners are responsible for policing their
own mark. 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 31:38 (4th ed. 2011).
166
Goldwasser, supra note 100, at 208–09.
167
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
164
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not require affirmative anti-counterfeiting action from the online
marketplace.168 Even though online marketplaces should not
have the burden of policing anyone’s trademark,169 more should
be expected from online marketplaces—they derive profit from
counterfeit sales that go undetected, they solicit second-hand
sales, and they are in a better position than the trademark
owners are to regulate who can use their services. The French
eBay cases made this point, and it would be prudent for the
United States to adopt it to some degree, given the United States’
strong position against counterfeiting.170 Thus, in addition to a
reactive take-down mechanism, the proposed trademark safeharbor provision would also require online marketplaces to
implement preventive anti-counterfeiting measures.
These
should deter would-be counterfeiters from using the website and
encourage accountability. Requiring online marketplaces to
implement both preventive and reactive measures will strike a
better balance between the rights and duties of both parties171
and set forth clear expectations from both parties.
IV. CREATING A SECONDARY TRADEMARK LIABILITY SAFEHARBOR PROVISION FOR ONLINE MARKETPLACES
A.

Borrowing from Copyright Law’s Approach to Online
Infringement

Because of similarities between the goals of trademark law
and copyright law, some concepts that have been useful for
copyright issues on the Internet can address certain trademark
issues. Like trademark law, copyright law protects intangible
property rights.172 Copyright law protects the form of expression
of an author’s ideas so that the author will not be discouraged
from investing time and energy in creative endeavors and
displaying the fruits of his or her creative labor in public.173 As is
the case in trademark law, the Internet can be a great tool for
disseminating ideas in the copyright context. But the Internet
168
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
169
See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 31:38 (4th ed. 2011).
170
See Goldwasser, supra note 100, at 235–36.
171
See JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 13, at 17.
172
See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 30, at 1364–66.
173
COLIN GOLVAN, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 7 (2007).

WF_de Chavez (Do Not Delete)

2012]

BUILDING A TRADEMARK SAFE HARBOR

12/3/2012 12:39 PM

271

can make infringement easier, faster, and harder to control.174 In
a world where technology enables immediate and perfect copies
of speech to be made and distributed, speakers and authors have
an interest in being able to exert greater control over their works
on the Internet. One response to this problem was the DMCA,175
which updated the United States Copyright Act to cope with
issues due to technological advances.176 The law attempts to
balance two interests: a creator’s right to control the distribution
and use of their work, and society’s interest in easily accessing
such valuable contributions on the Internet.177
The effects of this balancing act can be seen in § 512(c) of the
DMCA, which contains a safe-harbor provision. Essentially, an
Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) can limit its liability for
material on its website that infringes copyright by meeting three
requirements178: (1) the ISP should not have actual or
constructive knowledge of the infringing material posted on its
website, or of circumstances that create an awareness of such
infringement; (2) the ISP should not receive a financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing activity; and (3) should the
ISP be notified of infringing material on its website, the ISP
should immediately remove it.179 If the online service provider
174

See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998).
17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006).
176
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998).
177
COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH 145 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen
eds., 2005).
178
§ 512(c) states:
(1) In general.—A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief,
or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable
relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction
of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider—
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using
the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and
ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
179
Id.
175
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satisfies these requirements, it will not be liable for infringement
by its users. It strikes a balance between the competing interests
of the copyright owner and the ISP by forcing both parties to
work with each other—ISPs are encouraged to set up
mechanisms to promptly address copyright owners’ allegations of
infringing material on their websites.180 Since its adoption, the
DMCA has been tested in courts a number of times and
followed.181
Trademark law could benefit from a safe-harbor provision
similar to § 512(c) because it encourages cooperation between
trademark owners and online marketplaces. After Tiffany, a
trademark law similar to § 512(c) would itemize the specific
mechanisms that online marketplaces should have in place to
fight counterfeiting on their sites. First, a trademark safe-harbor
provision would keep the knowledge requirement prescribed by
§ 512(c). As demonstrated by Inwood and the cases leading up to
Tiffany, holding service providers liable for infringement that
they had specific knowledge of, or were willfully blind to,
encourages them to be diligent and vigilant about trademark
infringement occurring on their sites.182 The level of knowledge
required by Tiffany does not allow online marketplaces to look
the other way if they learn of specific instances of counterfeiting;
they must address the problem adequately.
Another feature to borrow directly from § 512(c) is a noticeand-takedown requirement. The Second Circuit praised eBay for
expeditiously removing listings of counterfeit items when they
were reported.183 The elements of eBay’s VeRO program should
form the basis of a statutory requirement for online auction sites.
First, available notice-and-takedown measures should be clear to
trademark owners and simple to use. Second, the auction site
should respond promptly to a good-faith notification of alleged
infringement on the website with a timely investigation. With

180
See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 21 (1998); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig.,
334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing the goal of safe harbors as encouraging
service providers to do “what it can reasonably be asked to do to prevent the use of
its service by ‘repeat infringers.’ ” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A))).
181
See Justin D. Fitzdam, Note, Private Enforcement of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act: Effective Without Government Intervention, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1085,
1094 (2005).
182
See, e.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
183
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied
131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
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regard to a reasonable time frame to expect a response, Tiffany is
an appropriate standard. Third, if there is infringement, the
auction site should promptly remove the listing. Such provisions
would promote communication and cooperation between the
trademark owner and the website, and set a standard for a
proper reactionary mechanism.
B.

Tailoring a Safe-Harbor Provision for Trademark Law

Due to the nature of the harm caused by trademark
infringement, requiring online marketplaces to implement only a
notice-and-takedown mechanism like VeRO is not enough.
Because the window of harm in the case of trademark
infringement is wider than that of copyright infringement, a safeharbor provision like § 512(c) should be modified accordingly.
For copyright owners, infringement occurs precisely when
unauthorized copying occurs. When the unauthorized copies are
removed or destroyed, there is no more copyright infringement.
In contrast, the harms caused by trademark infringement do not
necessarily end with the removal of a listing. There are two
examples to illustrate. First, the concept of pre-sale confusion
suggests that a trademark owner’s rights are injured, even if a
consumer decided not to buy it because the replica is less
appealing than an authentic item, or the item was taken down
beforehand.184 The unauthorized use of Tiffany’s mark to attract
a buyer already constitutes harm to the trademark owner.185
Taking down a listing is also ineffective because some users
deliberately seek counterfeit goods.186 The sale of counterfeit
goods creates post-sale confusion, which is also injurious to the
trademark owner.187 A notice-and-takedown mechanism alone
cannot adequately address these harms. The VeRO program still
leaves the trademark owner with the immensely daunting
challenge of monitoring eBay listings and assessing the
authenticity of items being sold.188 Adding to the difficulty is the
fact that the trademark owner can view the listings only as they
are accessible to the general public, preventing the owner from
184

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
186
See supra note 52. Searching for “replica” is easier on some websites than on
others (for example, on Yahoo! and not eBay).
187
See supra Part I.A.
188
See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 99.
185
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making initial assessments of the item before it is listed.189
Tiffany suggests that, for a significant number of counterfeit
listings, a trademark owner would never get to those listings that
are offered for a relatively short window of time, or even instant
sale.190 In such a case, they could not even avail themselves of
services like VeRO.
To address this problem, the proposed safe-harbor legislation
should also require online marketplaces to implement preventive
anti-counterfeiting measures that deter people from using the
website to sell counterfeit merchandise. Online marketplaces
should screen users more rigorously191 and require those selling
luxury brand goods to attest to its authenticity. Besides having a
deterrent effect, such measures would encourage accountability
from both the seller and the online marketplace. Together, these
measures would do away with some of the online anonymity that
counterfeiters hide behind. For instance, before allowing users to
list luxury, name-brand items, eBay could require users to
provide a certificate of authenticity for sales of brand-name
goods, or a notarized letter attesting to the product’s
authenticity. Another possibility is to work together with
reputable credit card or other payment services to implement
stricter sign-up requirements that include a credit check.192
Depending on the available technology, the online marketplace
should have some freedom in designing preventive anticounterfeiting measures. The bottom line is that a more effective
standard193 for online marketplaces for contributory trademark
infringement would include both preventive and reactive anticounterfeiting components.

189

James Ciula, What Do They Know? Actual Knowledge, Sufficient Knowledge,
Specific Knowledge, General Knowledge: An Analysis of Contributory Trademark
Infringement Considering Tiffany v. eBay, 50 IDEA 129, 140 (2009).
190
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010);
see also Steven Seidenberg, Mark Trail: Online Companies Get a Bye on Using
Trademarks, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 2010, available at http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/mark_trail/.
191
In her Note, Fara Sunderji suggested a statutory scheme imposing a “duty to
monitor” on online auction sites. Sunderji, supra note 76, at 943–44. This Note’s
suggestions for other ways to create an effective trademark safe-harbor provision are
based on a different perspective of the theories underpinning trademark law.
192
Miriam R. Albert, E-Buyer Beware: Why Online Auction Fraud Should Be
Regulated, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 575, 606 (2002).
193
See Sealy, Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc., 743 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984).
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CONCLUSION
Counterfeiting is dangerous on many levels, and so it should
be dealt with as seriously online as it is offline. A more effective
way to do so is to implement an anti-counterfeiting scheme that
has preventive and reactive elements. The current contributory
trademark infringement standard set forth in Tiffany is deficient
because it requires only reactive mechanisms from online
marketplaces, making it very difficult for trademark owners to
seek redress for infringement online. And in the case of the most
successful online marketplaces—which attract sellers of both
authentic and counterfeit items—trademark owners will have a
hard time proving that the defendant had “specific knowledge” of
counterfeiting.194 Worsening the problem is the added difficulty
of detecting and addressing online counterfeiting, thanks to the
speed, reach, and anonymity of the Internet. eBay’s VeRO
program is a powerful tool and a good model for similar sites.
Such a mechanism should be required for online marketplaces to
take advantage of a trademark safe-harbor statute. Take-down
mechanisms like eBay’s VeRO program, however, do not address
all the harms to trademark owners and consumers. Such
mechanisms are never triggered if nobody detects the
counterfeiting. While it is true that trademark owners, rather
than online marketplaces, are ultimately responsible for policing
their brand, online marketplaces are in a better position to find
more effective ways to combat counterfeiting because of their
greater expertise and access to the virtual marketplace.
Trademark law can benefit from a statutory safe-harbor
provision like the DMCA. Just as the DMCA did for copyright
law, an analogous trademark safe-harbor statute would
encourage online marketplaces to set up effective anticounterfeiting measures. This would also encourage a better
balance between the duties of trademark owners and those of
online marketplaces. Given how large the counterfeiting problem
is, the burden of enforcing trademark rights is too much for only
one party to bear.

194

See Berntsen, supra note 160.

